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CASE COMMENTS
LAw-EQuAL PROTECTION-APPwLATE REVIEW
BASED ON ABxrY TO PAY.-An Illinois statute

CONSTITUTIONAL
IN

CImvINAL

CASE

provides that 'Writs of error in all criminal cases are writs of right
and shall be issued of course." ILL. REV. STAT. c. 38, § 769.1 (1955).
Indigent defendants sentenced to death are provided with a free
transcript at the expense of the county where convicted, if they desire
a full appellate review, IL. REV. STAT. c. 88, § 769a (1955); but there
are no provisions for free transcripts in other criminal cases. Here,
indigent Ds, convicted in a state court of armed robbery, a noncapital offense, were refused a free copy of the transcript of the
record, which was needed for a full appellate review. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari after the Illinois supreme
court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Ds' petition which
charged that they were denied due process and equal protection.
Held, (5-4) that the denial of full appellate review solely on the
basis of Ds' inability to pay for a necessary transcript is a violation
of the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment. Vacated and remanded. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12
(1956).
It is well settled that a state is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate reviews. Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S.
505, 508 (1903); Mallett v. North Carolina,181 U.S. 589, 598 (1901);
McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894). However, a discriminatory denial of the statutory right of appeal is a violation of the equal
protection clause. Dowd v. Cook, 340 U.S. 206, 208 (1951). The
primary question in the principal case is whether a denial of appellate review solely because of Ds' poverty violates the equal protection clause. There has not been much litigation in the past
concerning discrimination in criminal cases on the basis of ability to
pay. In Carr v. Lanagan, 50 F. Supp. 41 (D. Mass. 1943), it was
held that a statute which required payment of a filing fee as a prerequisite to the filing of a petition for a writ of error did not deprive
one of the equal protection of the laws. Cf. Mason v. Cranor,42 Wn.
2d 610, 257 P.2d 211, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953); Winegardv.
Warden, 194 Md. 699, 69 A.2d 685 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
938 (1950). In at least one prior case, however, there was an expression of doubt as to whether appeals could be withheld solely on
the ground of a defendant's poverty. Boykin v. Huff, 121 F.2d 865
(D.C. Cir. 1941). But there is no prior case in accord with the
principal case. It therefore establishes a new principle of law.
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As a result of the principal case, the concept of equal justice
•for all comes closer to reality. How can it be said that justice is done
to one convicted of a crime if he is to be refused an appellate review
because he has no funds with which to prosecute an appeal? The primary purpose of allowing an appeal is to insure justice to the appellant.
ORFsID, C mRnNAL APPEAmr SN AMERIcA 32 (1939). This purpose
would be thwarted by refusing one an appeal because he has no
money. Borchard's work reminds us that in the past innocent per80

sons have been convicted of crimes. BoRcHAED,

CoNVICrING TM IN-

(1927). Furnishing free transcripts to indigent defendants
will be a further safeguard against punishment of an innocent
person. "There is perhaps no more touching situation in the stucfy
of criminal appeals than that of a defendant without adequate means
to take an appeal though he has grounds to take one." OlirMED, op.
cit. supra at 176.
NOCENT

Although the new rule may be desirable, its administration will
be accompanied by many practical problems. Justice Frankfurter,
concurring, warned that the new rule announced should be given
prospective effect only. However, the majority opinion did not
restrict its decision to the future. Presumably it applies to the past
as well. It is conceivable that many indigent prisoners will now
contend that they were denied their constitutional rights, since they
were not provided with free transcripts to enable them to appeal,
and will now seek release from custody. The handling of these
claims will present many problems.
Another probable outcome of the principal case is that the
dockets of the appellate courts will become crowded, as paupers
now will invariably seek to appeal a conviction. As a result not all
cases will receive the attention which they deserve.
Another problem will be that of determining who will pay the
cost of the transcripts if they are to be furnished to an indigent
defendant. Presumably public funds will have to be used. But
in some states a court may be without authority to authorize an
expenditure of public funds in such a situation. See, e.g., State ex
rel. Langhorne v. Superior Court, 32 Wash. 80, 72 Pac. 1027 (1903).
A situation could arise where (1) there are no provisions for
free transcripts, (2) there are no means of taking an appeal without
having a transcript, and (3) there are no provisions giving the
court authority to order an expenditure of public funds. In this
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situation how can an indigent defendant be granted an appellate
review? Will the court have to adopt new methods of procedure,
or will this be a situation where the rule of the principal case will
not apply? The language of the principal case seems broad enough
to require a state to change its appellate procedure: "Destitute
defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts." However,
subsequent interpretation of the principal case may impose certain
limitations on its application.
The principal case has been followed in People v. Jackson, 152
N.Y.S.2d 898 (1956), upon a similar set of facts. In Barber v. Gladden, 288 P.2d 986 (Ore. 1956), a statute requiring an appeal bond
as a condition to a right of appeal was held unconstitutional under
the equal protection clause, as applied to a prisoner who sought
to appeal a dismissal of his habeas corpus action. The decision was
based on the authority of the principal case. The Oregon court,
however, expressly limited the application of the decision to the
specific facts of the case, and made it plain that the decision was
not the result of their own reasoning, but resulted from the necessary implications of the principal case. Id. at 990. This is indicative
of the potential unpopularity of the principal case, and of the efforts
which will be made in the future to narrow its application.
The principal case establishes a new rule of law which represents another step toward the realization of equal justice for all.
However, the administration of the rule will involve a multitude of
problems, and may necessitate substantial changes in appellate procedure in some states. As a result, the principal case will probably
prove to be an unpopular decision.
R.M.

CONSTITUTIONAL

FRom PunrBc EMpLo

DuE PRocEss-ExcLusioN
mENT FOR INvoKING THE FMa AmEDmENr. -

LAw-PocEDURAL

Appellant was summarily discharged from his position as professor
at Brooklyn College, under the New York City charter, for exercising
the privilege against self-incrimination by refusing to answer authorized inquiries as to his Communist Party membership, when
appearing before a congressional committee investigating matters
of national security. Upon review by the highest state court, the
proceedings were upheld. Held, (5-4) that the summary dismissal
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